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Abstract 
Security (fear of immigration, Islamism and terrorism) has been the main factor in the European 
decision to launch a protracted and complex program of cooperation and development with the Arab 
Mediterranean countries. The main partners of the European Union countries were the Arab 
authoritarian regimes, seen as the best bulwark against the “Islamist threat”. Support for the 
development of a civil society that could in the long term creates the conditions for a transition 
towards democracy was mostly subcontracted to NGO’s or independent Foundations and restricted to 
technical issues. But the Arab Spring showed the failure of this policy: secularism is not a prerequisite 
for the rise of a democratic movement, islamist parties should be engaged and not shunned, and new 
patterns of migration (mobility instead of immigration) should be acknowledged. 
Keywords 
Mediterranean, Europe, Islam, Islamism, terrorism, immigration, security, "arab spring", 
democratisation, religion, secularism. 
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1. When security concerns lead to aid for development 
From 1988 onwards, the European Union has launched an ambitious program of partnership with the 
southern part of the Mediterranean Sea. The project took a more institutionalized form in 1995 under 
the name of “Barcelona Process”, or “Euro-Mediterranean partnership”. The project of the “Union for 
the Mediterranean”, launched in July 2008 by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was supposed to 
encompass and enlarge the previous structures, although it had been launched with little consultation 
between the different governments. Based in Barcelona, it took over the Barcelona Process, and was 
conceived as an inter-government structure to deal with all the dimensions of cooperation. 
The aim of the Barcelona process was to go beyond the purely economical and bilateral agreements 
signed between the EU and some Mediterranean countries, in order to build up a regional framework 
of cooperation in different fields. The necessity to have an all-encompassing policy of cooperation 
with the other side of the Mediterranean was understood essentially as a way to deal with security 
issues, namely immigration, terrorism and the spread of radical Islam. The three issues were seen as 
closely connected. While the debate on immigration in the United States focusses on the immigration 
of Catholic Latinos, in Europe, the debate on Islam is largely shaped by the process of massive 
immigration that started in the 1960s and led to the permanent settlement of a huge Muslim population 
in Western Europe. Immigration and fear of Islamic radicalism are thus intimately linked in Europe. 
This debate on “Islam in Europe” had a spill-over effect on European policy towards the Middle East. 
Interestingly enough immigration was not seen as an economic issue (as it was in the sixties and early 
seventies), but as a “threat”: the fear of immigration has been playing a greater role in European 
domestic politics since the 1980’s, and the rise of populist movements in the first decade of the XXIth 
century pushed the governments in charge to put the control of immigration on the top of their agenda. 
Islam has been seen as a threat at two levels: in geo-strategic terms the rise of radical Islam in the 
Middle East raised the ghost of a global confrontation between the West and the Muslim world; in 
purely security terms, the second generation immigrants was seen as a fertile soil for recruiting 
terrorism. The growing visibility of a Muslim faith community in Europe is seen as a geo-strategic 
issue: in fact religious radicalisation is too often seen, without real debate on the issue, as a harbinger 
for political radicalisation and terrorism. Veil, mosques, burqas became a top issue in public debate, 
fuelling a pervasive islamophobia, that plays on this connexion between external and domestic threats.  
The Algerian civil war, starting in 1992, followed almost ten years later by the terror attack of 9/XI, 
lumped together the two threats (domestic and geo-strategic) and made the Middle East appear as a 
global security issue: Islam became associated with global jihad. The rise of Islamism in the Arab 
countries could pit the Muslim World against the West, entailing a risk of terrorism, armed conflicts 
and a threat on the energy supply. The Europeans have a rather “territorial” perception of the threat: 
enemies are on our borders, and could attack with the help of a fifth column, already living in Europe. 
Hence to secure its border Europe should prevent its Mediterranean neighbours to turn into Islamic 
republics. Due to the fact that both immigration and Islamic radicalization were seen as a consequence 
of unemployment, demographic tensions and lack of economic development, a policy of cooperation 
to promote development was explicitly seen as part and parcels of a quest for security. One of the 
possible ways to diminish the flux of immigration from the South was to favour an economic 
development; of course the European Union was well aware of the structural obstacles to such a 
development (bureaucracy, corruption, bad governance), and proposed also to help the Arab states to 
reform themselves. 
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2. A double track policy of cooperation 
It is thus clear that security was the key word of the policy of cooperation. This was a two-level 
cooperation. On one hand, security, counter terrorism, immigration control, and, often, management of 
Islam in Europe, were dealt with in direct negotiations with the different regimes at an official level 
(for instance, the composition of the French Council of Muslim Faith has been negotiated, behind the 
curtain, between the French government and its Algerian and Moroccan counterpart, although 
officially the Council is elected by the believers). A technical support for promoting good governance 
and for reforming institutions was also offered to the regimes, but of course they took only what fit 
with their own security concerns (training of riot police for instance). 
On the other hand, the long term perspective of the Barcelona process was to bring the Arab 
societies closer to the Western model of democracy and religious freedom by encouraging 
democratisation, gender equality, the development of a civil society, and by establishing a dialogue 
between “civilizations”. The European Union tried to address directly the Arab “civil societies”, 
knowing perfectly well that the regimes will not reform themselves. The idea was to strengthen in the 
long run a “modern” civil society that could be the basis for a process of secular democratisation, 
rejecting both “Islamic fundamentalism” and “dictatorship”. The regimes were thus seen as a bulwark 
against radicalism, necessary as long as the civil society was not mature enough to reject “radicalism” 
by itself.  
The problem was that from the beginning the decision was taken to give priority to state to state 
relations, putting the regimes at the core of the process, even when they were part of the problem 
(Algeria, Libya). And of course, by definition, the regimes were either reluctant or totally opposed to 
any direct contacts and cooperation between the European states and the civil society, not to speak of 
the opposition. The regimes wanted to have the monopoly of the dialogue, with the clear objective to 
stay in charge. It is only in the case of Libya that the EU briefly succeeded in pushing the regime to 
give up terrorism and to collaborate in a program of reducing the sub-saharian immigration, with of 
course a price to be paid: turning a blind eye on the repression of freedom (and Europe will have to set 
the bill in 2011), and accepting to be taken hostage by the policy of the regime (who alternatively 
closed and opened the tap of immigration). 
Europe never considered seriously engaging the Islamists: endeavours by private NGO’s (for 
instance the “San Egidio” community based in Rome) were turned down, mostly at the request of 
France. The Arab states never hesitated to blackmail any government that could be tempted to discus 
with the Islamists. The consequence is that the debate on Islam was managed in the loose framework 
of different initiatives (like the “Alliance of Civilizations”), which involved mainly (although not 
exclusively) officials and clerics closely associated with the regimes 
The second level of the European policy was hence sub-contracted to NGO’s, all of them heavily 
subsidized by Brussels or by the different governments. They were supposed to work directly with the 
“civil society” without antagonizing the regimes: this supposes a low profile and a purely technical 
approach, avoiding political issues. In this framework, all the programs that could create a political 
problem (democratization, freedom of press, gender issue) were adjudicated either to local NGO’s or 
to big Foundations that would deal at a larger level, as the Foundation Anna Lindt for the inter-cultural 
dialogue, the different German “Stiftung” (Adenauer, Ebert). 
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3. The intellectual framework: clash/dialogue of civilizations 
But besides the feasibility of such a dual track approach (which would show its limit during the Arab 
spring), the issue is the coherence of the intellectual framework that underlines all the process. 
Roughly speaking the project was based from the beginning on the “clash of civilizations” paradigm 
and tried to turn it into a “dialogue of civilizations” paradigm. This means that the “dialogue” shares 
the same premises that the “clash” theory and differs only in offering a more pro-active policy of 
engagement instead of containment. The common premise may be summed up that way: there is an 
“Islamic civilization” or “culture” (the two terms being here used indistinctively) which is based on 
the tenets of Islam as a religion; this culture is all encompassing and determinates the political culture, 
the economic life and the social relations of the Muslims, who continued as migrants to be “acted” by 
their Islamic culture. Conversely, Europe is defined as Christian and/or secular, and thus, in both cases 
cannot integrate Muslims, except if they stop to be Muslims; although this last point was not officially 
stated as such during the 1990’s: it is only after 2001 that more and more European politicians, under 
the pressure of the populist movements, begun to stress the “Christian” identity of Europe, whatever it 
means. This is tantamount to putting in place a policy of reciprocal “capitulations” (a set of 
agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the French monarchy, which gave France a right of 
representing and patronizing the Oriental Christians): the Europeans are supposed to protect the 
Christian Middle Eastern minorities (they failed, but feel guilty, -see for instance the debate on the 
Armenian genocide), while Muslim states speak in the name of a supposedly Muslim diaspora in 
Europe (as some Arab countries tried to do during the Danish cartoons affair). The model of the late 
Ottoman millet paradigm is back or, more precisely, never ceased to be at the core of the definition of 
a peaceful trans-Mediterranean co-existence.  
This perception presupposes that the close connection between territory, religion and culture that 
characterized the great historical empires is still at work, and that this has been and still is a great 
challenge for Western countries.  
To sum up, the policies set down there have included: 
 Preventing new migrations by developing the southern Mediterranean tier. 
 Integrating Muslims settled in Europe through a policy of some sort of affirmative action. 
 Preventing religious radicalization through a “dialogue with Islam”.  
We will see how this intellectual framework did shape European policies, and why it is largely 
irrelevant. The whole approach of the Mediterranean is still based on geostrategic security 
considerations, rather than acknowledgement of an in-depth tectonic change: integration, mobility, 
democratization. 
4. Integration of migrants 
The European states have forged tools to integrate Muslim migrants starting out from the premise of 
the encounter between two “civilizations”. These tools have taken the form of two models of policy, 
both officially aimed at insuring the integration of the second generation of Muslim migrants: the 
mostly French “assimilationist” model, and the Northern European “multi-culturalist” model. 
Although apparently in total contradiction, they in fact share the same basic assumption that there is a 
permanent connection between religion and culture. In the assimilationist model, new citizens should 
join a new national secular political culture, and thus give up their faith or limit it to the private sphere: 
to join a new culture is to accept a new definition of religion and embrace the secularism that has 
explicitly been constructed against religion (laïcité). In the multiculturalist model, religion is perceived 
as being permanently linked with a culture of origin and thus both terms (religion and culture) are used 
almost as synonyms: the term “Muslim” tends to be used as a neo-ethnic term and not as a reference to 
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an individual faith (hence the headlines on the “Muslim revolt” during the youth riots in the French 
suburbs in 2005). I argue that both models are in fact modern transcriptions of the old European 
Westphalian principle: cujus regio-ejus religio. 
For the French model, assimilation is conditioned on a prerequisite: secularization. There can only 
be integration if religion is restricted to the private sphere. Laïcité is more or less the official “religion” 
or at least political ideology: instead of being cast in terms of neutrality (which is both the letter and 
the spirit of the 1905 Law that established the separation of Church and State), it is too often presented 
as a system of positive values which supersedes religious norms and beliefs. Assimilation here has 
something to do with the process of conversion, and the State has the right to check on conformity 
with the model (see for instance the decision of the French Conseil d’Etat to confirm the denial of 
citizenship to a burqa-wearing Moroccan woman for an “excessive practice of religion”). Hence laïcité 
appears to be more a state ideology or at least a national political culture than just a set of rules of the 
game. It is implicitly cast as some sort of “official” religion. I don’t want to make a too far-fetched 
comparison, but it somehow resembles the forced conversions imposed on the Muslims who became 
subjects after conquest (e.g. Spain after the fall of Granada in 1492).  
Conversely, according to the multi-culturalist model, the second generation of immigrants should 
be allowed, and even encouraged, to stick with their culture of origin: that of the country of origin. But 
the group is defined as a “minority”, where religious and ethnic patterns are lumped together. Multi-
culturalism is not “métissage” because it does not suppose a synthesis, a quest for a higher identity that 
could subsume the pristine identities, beyond the purely legal definition of citizenship. The model that 
comes to mind here is the Ottoman model of the millet: in this context, it is quite logical to hear 
proposals to integrate some part of the sharia into a personal status code that can be managed by 
religious courts of arbitration (as the Archbishop of Canterbury proposed in 2008). Moreover, to use a 
religious criterion to define the minority means that, symmetrically, the dominant group is also defined 
by its religion, even if it is a secularized form of that religion. We are still in the cujus regio ejus 
religio. It is not by chance that Prime Minister Tony Blair waited to leave Downing Street before 
announcing his conversion to Catholicism. 
Without entering into details, the evolution of Muslims in Europe shows how in fact they adapt by 
disconnecting the religious marker (hallal for instance) from the cultural maker (“oriental food”) and 
recasting it with western cultural markers (hallal fast food). What is changing is not theology but 
religiosity, that is the way the believer experiences his or her relation with religion. What we see is an 
individualization of faith, a construction of religious congregations on the model of the other faiths 
(local mosques), a recasting of gender relations (executive women wearing the veil), and adaptation to 
Western institution (Muslim chaplains), a diversification of the religious field, a reconstruction of a 
faith community above the former ethno-cultural community. In fact, integration is done also through 
religious practices, and not through a growing secularization. 
5. Immigration versus mobility 
The European policy towards immigration does not reflect the new patterns of mobility and settlement 
around the Mediterranean. The bulk of migrations now come from beyond the Mediterranean. There is 
no longer a massive labour migration stemming from the Mediterranean countries. Fluxes are more 
fluid, circulation also goes in both directions: elderly Europeans are settling in Tunisia and Turkey for 
retirement, the jet-set has its fashionable quarters in Morocco. Many second generation graduates or 
entrepreneurs are looking for job opportunities or are investing in business and companies that play on 
trans-Mediterranean joint ventures (real estate, travel agencies, import-export, medical activities, 
education, holiday resorts, etc.). The increasing number of people with dual citizenship facilitates 
these new patterns of circulation. The informal or grey economy also, by definition, plays on these 
transnational networks which go far beyond family ties and “ethnic business”. 
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Migrations from the Mediterranean areas (not the new migrations from China, Iraq, Afghanistan or 
sub-Sahelian Africa) are more flexible, temporary and reversible than before. In fact we should speak 
more of labour mobility or even professional mobility than labour migration: some educated young 
Moroccans may have a French passport, take a job in London, then return to Morocco or go to Abu-
Dhabi to open a business. Instead, governments try to fix the population: visa restrictions force people 
to move less, but also to stay once they are in the West, legally or illegally, while they could move 
more easily if they feel more secure about their administrative status. The social status of many second 
generation immigrants has improved and is slowly changing the matrimonial patterns. The old pattern 
(marrying a cousin from the bled in order to bring new family members into Europe) is not dead but is 
increasingly being replaced by the mobility of young graduates and young entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, students and relatives are treated too often as potential immigrants. The fact that a 
country like Turkey is hardly exporting manpower any more is not taken into consideration. The 
process of territorialisation has been unable to stop illegal migration while thwarting many positive 
dynamics for mutual development. But once again, this endeavour to territorialize the populations is a 
legacy of the territorial statist nation-state, and is at the core of the populists’ agenda. 
The European construction process runs against the paradigm of the nation state and is more in tune 
with contemporary forms of mobility. Often mocked and despised, the evolutive and elusive European 
Union, where flexibility and bureaucracy make strange but already mature bedfellows, could deal 
perfectly with our Mediterranean complexity. Instead of aping the nation-state or dreaming of past 
empires, Europe could look positively upon its own incompletion as a better tool to manage fluxes, de-
territorialization and globalization. Europe has inaugurated a new relationship with territorialisation: 
there are different levels (the 27, Schengen, euro-zone) and a permanent virtual expansion because of 
its inability to define a real border. As we have seen, this does not mean an open space: borders have 
too often been replaced by internal fences, walls and ghettoes, but at least there is a juxtaposition of 
different spaces.  
6. Ignoring the Islamists and the role of Islam 
The “Arab spring”, but also its more shaky aftermath, shows how the European policy of fostering 
civil society without engaging the Islamists was a mistake. First the actors of the Arab spring, if they 
were open to the global world, were not a product of the policy of cooperation and development 
initiated by the European Union. Secondly there was not such a thing as the development of a “liberal 
Islam” preceding the spread of democratic ideas. And thirdly the Islamists might be the reluctant 
actors of a democratization process. To grasp what is happening, we must set aside a number of deep-
rooted prejudices. The first of these is the assumption that democracy presupposes secularisation. The 
second is the idea that a democrat is, by definition, also a liberal. Historically, this has not been the 
case. The American Founding Fathers were not secularists; for them, the separation of church and 
state was a way of protecting religion from government, not the reverse. The French Third Republic 
was established in 1871 by a predominantly conservative, Catholic, monarchist parliament that had 
just crushed the Paris Commune. Christian democracy developed in Europe not because the church 
wanted to promote secular values, but because it was the only way that it could maintain political 
influence. Finally, let's not forget that populist movements in Europe today align themselves with 
Christian democracy in calling for the continent's Christian identity to be inscribed in the EU 
constitution. 
Islamists in the Arab world deplore secularisation, the influence of western values and the excesses 
of individualism. Everywhere, they seek to affirm the centrality of religion to national identity and 
they are conservative in all areas except the economy. And in Egypt, like any party swept to power in 
an electoral landslide, they are tempted to think that they can dispense with the grubby business of 
forming alliances and distributing government posts equitably. In any case, why would the Islamists, 
with no democratic culture to speak of, behave like good democrats who believe in pluralism? No 
doubt many activists are asking themselves the same question. 
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The Islamists are certainly neither secularists nor liberals, but they can be democrats. It is not the 
convictions of political actors that shape their policies but the constraints to which they are subject. 
The Islamists are entering an entirely new political space: this was not a revolution in which a 
dictatorship was replaced by a regime that resembled its predecessor. There have been elections and 
there will be a parliament. Political parties have been formed and, whatever the disappointments and 
fears of the secular left, it will be difficult simply to close down this new space, because what brought 
it into being in the first place - a savvy, connected young generation, a spirit of protest - is still there. 
Islamist movements throughout the region are constrained to operate in a democratic arena that they 
didn't create and which has legitimacy in the eyes of the people. 
It is significant, in this regard, that nowhere has the cult of the charismatic strong man reappeared. 
Instead, there are political parties and a new culture of debate that has influenced even the Islamists. 
These developments were not created by accident but are the direct consequence of deep social 
transformations that are irreversible, whatever the strength of the reactions to them. After all, you can't 
change a society by decree. In Iran, all the indicators suggest that society has become more modern 
and secular under the mullahs; although the law allows girls as young as nine to be married, statistics 
show that the average age at which Iranian women get married has continued to rise - today it stands at 
more than 25. In short, we are not seeing a return to a traditional society. 
Furthermore, the protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia were shaped not by an ideology as all-
encompassing as the regimes that they toppled (which was the case in Iran in 1979), but by the ideals 
of democracy, pluralism and good governance. In Iran in 1979, elections were held in the name of the 
Islamic Republic. The message was clear: this was an ideological revolution (even if there was 
disagreement about its complexion between the red of the Marxist-Leninists and the green of the 
Islamists). There is nothing of the kind in either Egypt or Tunisia. There is no revolutionary or 
ideological dynamic. 
The "Islamic" electorate in Egypt today is not revolutionary; it is conservative. It wants order. It 
wants leaders who will kick-start the economy and affirm conventional religious values, but it is not 
ready for the great adventure of a caliphate or an Islamic republic. And the Muslim Brotherhood 
knows this. It needs to attract voters because it doesn't have the means to seize power by force, which 
in any case it does not wish to do. And even if it did, it does not have the technical wherewithal to do 
so, as it doesn't control the police or the armed forces and has no paramilitary militia. Moreover, the 
Islamists don't enjoy a religious monopoly of the public sphere. There are other movements, such as 
the Sufis and the Salafists. The paradox of the Arab spring is that al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, one of 
Egypt's most important religious institutions, has found a new legitimacy: the imam of al-Azhar, 
Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, has become an advocate of human rights, liberty and, above all, the 
separation of religious institutions from the state. This means that, in contrast to Iran, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is unable to "say what Islam says". The religious arena, too, has become pluralistic and 
open to democratic pressure, even if, for the faithful, there are some things that remain non-negotiable. 
A credible and relevant policy of security, either domestic or regional, should reject the culturalist 
prejudices, not because they are not politically correct, but simply because they don’t work. 
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